The financial crisis that began in 2008 has shown that there are externalities from a dysfunctional mortgage system that spill over to the rest of the economy and can have international repercussions. The breakdown of the mortgage system in the US has led to the deepest recession since World War II and is still hampering economic growth.
This chapter will look into the housing finance crises of the United States and how the housing finance system can be reformed. There is widespread agreement that the US housing finance system was the epicenter of the financial crisis. However, most proposals for reform are fairly timid.
Comparing the features of the US housing finance system with those of other countries reveals a number of differences that make it easier to understand why the US housing finance system in particular was prone to failure. High credit risk, low margins, lack of interest alignment, and small buffers characterize the US system. In addition, no other system in the Western world has so much government involvement.
It is particularly instructive to compare US development to that of Denmark, as the systems share many structural characteristics but performed very differently. Both countries offer 30-year, fixed-rate callable loans, financed by pass-through securities. Both countries experienced approximately the same level of housing price inflation until about 2007 and thereafter a dramatic drop in housing prices of about 25 to 30 percent peak to trough. The United States saw widespread delinquencies, foreclosures, and massive loan losses hitting the mortgage lenders in the aftermath of the housing bubble. Danish mortgage lenders, on the other hand, experienced only moderate increases in delinquent loans, and the rate of foreclosures rose only marginally over the long-term average. Unlike the US government, the Danish government did not need to bail out mortgage lenders.
We will argue that a few crucial differences between Denmark and the US in the design of their housing finance systems made a dramatic difference. 
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Substantial government involvement in the US system is a peculiar feature, in particular given the general organization of the US economy. Weak creditor protection, including the prevalence of non-recourse loans, is another area where the US system differs substantially from Denmark's.
In this chapter we will review the recent literature about the US housing finance system and the financial crisis, pinpoint the characteristics of the US system in an international context, and make an in-depth comparison of US development with that of Denmark.
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the problems, discuss objectives for mortgage reform, and try to identify proposals, as well as the features of systems from other countries that could serve as inspiration for the reform of US mortgage finance.
We focus on four objectives for a reform of the mortgage system: (1) a mortgage system should make it possible for households to acquire a home when they need it most; that is, early in an individual's productive life, when income and savings are likely to be lowest (the affordability problem). This rules out systems with high owner-down payment requirements, which would otherwise have been an obvious way to reduce the risks in mortgage finance; (2) a mortgage system should be robust when house prices fall; for example, a fall in housing prices should not put the financial system at risk. This suggests that the risks should be distributed to those who can handle them; (3) a mortgage system should be able to continue to finance mortgage lending during and after a financial crisis; and (4) government involvement in the form of guarantees, regulatory benefits, or other subsidies should be minimal.
We believe that a covered bond system is the way to go for US housing finance. However, the specific design of the system has implications for how well it meets the four objectives.
What Does the Recent Literature Tell Us?
The US housing finance system has been the subject of a vast amount of literature, and the financial crisis has not stopped the flow of analysis and recommendations.
It is widely accepted that the turn in housing markets, which began in 2006, triggered the financial crisis, 1 and that the design of the housing finance system contributed significantly to the downturn that subsequently hit financial markets and the economy. Many other mechanisms were obviously also in play, including macroeconomic policies that contributed to a build-up of risk appetite; other aspects of the financial system, such as leverage; the inherent instability of banking; and the failure of all checks and balances, ranging from management, ratings agencies, and supervisors to those in charge of monitoring financial stability.
